I address a debate between Penny Arcade and Jim Sterling. http://www.escapistmagazine.com/videos/view/jimquisition/5972-Rape-vs-Murder
The issue is: For videogames, is shooting morally different from raping? They’re both bad things, obviously– but isn’t the point of video games to let us go into a different sort of reality where we can do bad things without actually hurting anyone? There are at least three recognized approaches to questions of morality: Utilitarian, deontological, and virtue.
Utilitarians are interested in total net outcomes, so if no one is actually hurt and someone is happy because they played the game, it’s probably ok. (If the player ends up hurting people as a result of playing, the utilitarian might object.) Deontologists have to decide whether the rules that govern morality apply to imaginations and simulations of immoral behavior (18th century Kant doesn’t say much about virtual reality as we think of it).
Virtue ethics is general more concerned with how a person is motivated and what traits she or he cultivates. They might want to know: “Why do you want to simulate shooting or raping?” If you have a desire for immoral behavior for which you are simple finding a socially acceptable outlet, the virtue theorist does not approve. Goodness, on Aristotle’s view, is not wanting to do something bad but choosing not to. That is mere continence. Being good consists in wanting to do good things, not in merely avoiding the evil one desires to enact.
There is another approach to this issue, perhaps from the camp of the phenomenologists (who are interested in what we experience and how). In modern video game, I can shoot and kill 100 “bad guys” in minutes. I can shoot them with sniper rifles from hundreds of yards away. I can surprise them when they turn a blind corner. Not that we would want to, but could we imagine a simulation in which our avatar rapes 100 people in only a few minutes? Without wanting to get too into the awful details, rape seems (and I’m lucky that I wouldn’t really know) to be a very personal and intimate crime. It takes more time than does the pulling of a trigger. It involves being in the other person’s space— part of what makes it horrid is how up-close and deeply personal it is. It has a feel and an experience altogether distinct from running into a room of enemies and spraying bullets and running out. The murders of video games may be considered more acceptable than the simulations of sex crimes because the experience of the simulation is decidedly different. One can be uninvolved or unaffected by a repeated and impersonal slaughter-simulation, but one cannot be aloof or disengaged in a simulation of a personal, knowing, invasive act.
(NOTE: I have never done, nor ever intend to do, EITHER of these things! Sometimes explaining hell means imagining hellishness. Maybe killing a room full of people feels just like committing a sex crime. I hope I never get to find out empirically.)
Most videogame slaughter can be understood as mechanical and impersonal. It is inconceivable that sexual crimes could be simulated in a comparably impersonal and wholesale fashion. I conclude that the impersonal slaughter of videogames poses less of a moral problem than does the simulation of rape because of the distinctly different phenomenology of the experience. (Of course, there are plenty of other reasons to accept the same conclusion that do not conflict with the reasoning I offer here.)